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Guy E. Noyes, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System
O
Fwhat I have seen of the work of the
Commission on Money and Credit, one
thing stands out.It is a part of one question
addressed by one task force to the Federal
Reserve Board, and it reads as follows: "Given
the customary credit control instruments and
the ultimate objectives of price stability, high-
level employment, and economic growth —
howis monetary policy formulated in the short
run?For instance, what sort of factors are
weighed in determining current policy, what
guides are utilized and what are the immediate
objectives of policy?"
The merits of the Board's reply, the many
contributed papers, the Commission's Report,
and recent monetary policy itself, are all cer-
tainly debatable —butI submit, if you will
pardon the use of strong language, that this is
a damned good question. It asks, politely but
firmly, that we omit the usual garbage about
opposition to sin and advocacy of motherhood,
and just say what it is we are trying to in-
crease, decrease, or hold still.
The Board's reply ran to some 35 double-
spaced pages.The burden of drafting was
carried by my colleague, Woody Thomas, who
was assisted and hindered at various stages by
other members of the staff. I would argue that
it is a good reply, by any standards, and an
outstanding one, after allowance is made for
the necessity of producing it in an institutional
framework.It is necessarily complicated by
the inescapable fact that, even in the short
run, the monetary authority is confronted with
a variety of measures by which it may judge
the impact of its operations.
Any single short-run objective has obvious
deficiencies.The with the bill rate
as an exclusive short-run target is,I think,
widely understood. The situation with respect
to the use of a free reserve target is somewhat
different.This synthetic pearl of a number
has many virtues.It is simple, easy to under-
stand, largely devoid of seasonality, closely
related to many significant factors affecting
policy, and it is published for all the world
to see every Thursday.It also has certain
deficiencies. So far as I have been able to as-
certain, everyone is convinced that he himself
understands these clearly, but has grave doubt
that anyone else does.
I am going to take a giant step and assume
that this audience understands both the vir-
tues and vices of free reserves and plunge
ahead on that basis.
A part of the reply to the question I men-
tioned at the outset ran as follows:
Whatever broad influences may flow from their
actions, the Board of Governors and the Federal
Open Market Committee are fully aware that the
particular economic or financial variable over which
they have anything approaching full and direct con-
trolisthetotalofcommercialbankreserves.
Through this control, they exert a strong influence
directly on total loans and investments and total
deposits of banks and indirectly some influence on
spending, investment, and saving by the public in
general.But, at any given moment, the choice for
Federal Reserve policy lies between various degrees
of restraint upon or encouragement to expansion of
bank credit through altered reserve availability.
I believe there has never been much ques-
tion that the volume of reserves available to
the banking system is at least one of the appro-
priate short-runobjectivesofpolicy.The
problem has been to bring it under control
statistically, and itis with respect to our
efforts to tame this beast that I shall address
the remainder of these brief comments.
One of the great problems in measuring sig-
nificant changes in reserve availability in the
short-run has always been the substantial re-
current and random variation.If we are to
use effectively targets expressed in terms of net
additions to (or decreases in) the reserve base,
we must be able to distinguish between changes
that are purely seasonal or otherwise transitory
and those of a more fundamental nature.It
is not too difficult to see these trends in the
longer run —fromyear to year or even from
quarter to quarter —butitis almost impos-
sible to spot them in the raw data in the short-
run.
As you all know, far and away the bulk of
the reserve provision and absorption in any
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year is to offset seasonal swings.Therefore,
a measure based on total reserves must first be
adjusted to make allowance for purely seasonal
operations. In this case, somewhat more than
the usual amount ofstatistical legerdemain
was required, since for short-run purposes it
is necessary to have weekly seasonal factors.
A second kind of adjustment built into the
available reserves measure pertains to changes
in federal government deposits at commercial
banks. These balances, chiefly Treasury tax
and loan accounts, go through wide gyrations
whenever tax, expenditure, and financing flows
fail to mesh precisely. These changes in Treas-
ury balances have little independent economic
significance; banks generally realize that large
swings are transitory, and certainly they have
no effect upOn Federal spending programs. It
can be argued, therefore, that reserves pro-
vided or absorbed by changes in Treasury ac-
counts should be excluded for much the same
reason that we calculate reserve availability
net of many other factors that provide or ab-
sorb reserves. To make our reserve measure
correspond with this judgment, we subtract
from the total whatever amounts of reserves
arerequiredbehindgovernmentdeposits.
This is not to say that the occasional shifts
from private to public deposits, and back, do
not have a significance with respect to the
privately owned money supply;those shifts
that are seasonally repetitive are allowed for
by our program for seasonally adjusting avail-
able reserves, while more irregular shifts that
might be associated with private purchases of
a new Treasury issue are allowed to appear as
a decline in the available reserves measure.
Through these adjustments we arrive at the
net of what we call "available reserves" —
thenet change in total reserves after allowing
for reserves provided or absorbed to offset
seasonal factors and changes in Treasury tax
and loan balances at member banks. For the
period since mid-1961, this is shown by the
top line on Chart i.it portrays from week to
week the increase(or decrease), seasonally
adjusted, in the reserves available to support
privatedepositsatmemberbanks.One
school of purists, but not another, prefer to
also deduct borrowings, thus arriving at a non-
borrowed available reserve concept; in other
words, the net increase (or decrease) in re-
serves, resulting from operations at the Sys-
tem's initiative.
As I am sure you have already deduced, the
distance between the nonborrowed line and the
bottom line —requiredreserves against pri-
vate deposits, seasonally adjusted —isyoux
old friend free reserves.
For better or worse, the change in available
reserves is one of the short-run objectives of
policy presently being employed by the Federal
Open Market Committee. For example, these
are the numbers behind the expressed objec-
tive, contained in that part of the last pub-
lished policy directive (December 1961),
whichsaid that "...operationsfor the Sys-
tem Open Market Account shall be conducted
with a view to providing reserves for bank
credit and monetary expansion (with allow-
ance for the wide seasonal movements cus-
tomary at this time of the year), but with a
somewhat slower rate of increase in total re-
serves than during recent months."
I am not sure whether or not an available
reserve target formulated in these terms is a
good short-run objective for the monetary au-
thority, but the concept should be a gold mine
foritscritics.Why did the monetary au-
thoritiescause —orallow —availablere-
serves to increase at an annual rate of about
8 per cent from the first part of August to
the last part of December 1961?Wouldn't
6 or 5 or 4, or something else, have been more
appropriate?Or, betterstill,granting that
the up and down in December and January
can be attributed to an extraordinary seasonal
bulge, why did they bring the growth rate to
a grinding halt in February and March of this
year? As you can see, it has endless possibil-
ities.
Without further ado, I present you herewith,
free of charge, the handy academicians' pre-
fabricateddo-it-yourself FRB baitingkit.
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CHART I. —RESERVESSUPPORTING PRIVATE DEPOSIT, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED, MAY 3 TO APRIL II, 1962
1961 1962
NOTE: Adiustedrequiredreservesequals seasonallyadjusted requiredreservesheldagainstactualdemanddepositsadjusted —not
interbank demand deposits — and time deposits.Adjusted availablereservesequals adjusted required reserves plus actualexcessreserves.
Adjusted nonborrowed reserves equals availablereserves less actual member bank borrowings.Annual rates of monetary expansion based on
seasonally adjusted levels ofreservesheld against demand deposits adjusted and time deposits in November 1961.
COMMENT
STEIN,
Committee for Economic Development
I am pleased that others have risen to ex-
plain and defend the Commission on Money
and Credit in response to some of the con-
descending and scornful remarks that have been
made about it.I would like to add a few com-
ments of my own on this subject.
Certainly there are problems within its field
that the Commission did not solve. These un-
solved problems may be the most important
ones.It is the function of economists to point
this out and to try to fill the gaps. But we
should also try to be clear about the reasons
for the deficiencies. We should not kid ourselves
with the idea that the deficiencies exist be-
cause the Commission consisted of twenty men
who were not economists and who had various
interests not usually shared by economists —
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I believe the Commission report fairly re-
ilects the current state of professional eco-
nomic thinking in the field it covers.I think
the Commission's findings not only are con-
sistent with the professional consensus but also
pretty well exhaust that consensus. You will
understand that I have taken no survey and
report only fragmentary observation.But I
am willing to accept your judgment on the
matter. If you ask yourself not what you think
but what your professional colleagues, some-
how taken as a whole, think —wouldthe re-
sults be so much different from the Commis-
sion's results?
Of course, even if I am correct this does
not absolve the Commission. The Commission
did not have to buy the professional con-
sensus. Certainly we could hope that the Com-
mission would do much better than the con-
sensus. But if the Commission is not absolved,
we as economists must also share responsibility.
Those who participate in the expert consensus
are hardly in a position to complain; those
who do not should first ask themselves why
they have failed to convince their colleagues.
In his paper, Martin Bronfenbrenner listed
three circumstances that might, in his words,
"disturb the apologetic smugness of practical
men regarding our monetary and fiscalar-
rangements, and permit reform proposals to
be considered with biases in their favor rather
than the reverse." These three circumstances
are all calamities of one kind or another.I
was surprised that he did not list a fourth cir-
cumstance, that expert opinion might con-
verge on the need for fundamental reform and
on the direction which that reform should
take.I believe such a development would
have a shocking effect on practical men. Per-
haps Bronfenbrenner considered it too unlikely
to deserve mention.
Now you may ask of what use is an amateur
Commission that endorses the expert consen-
sus.If the Commission has no choice but to
endorse the experts I would think the Com-
mission serves no purpose. But Commissions
do not always endorse the expert opinion and
this Commission certainly did not have to.If
the Commission chooses to agree with the ex-
perts, its usefulness depends upon the validity
of the expert opinion. The Commission adds
to the general acceptance of the expert opin-
ion and increases the likelihood of its being
reflected in policy,lithe expert opinion is
wrong, that is harmful. But if a Commission
is going to be wrong, there is not much more
harm in endorsing expert errors than in in-
venting. its own.
A word of explanation of the Commission's
background may be helpful. The Commission
was not established in the belief that there was
necessarily something basically wrong with
the American monetary system that called for
radical reform. However, the Commission was
set up against the background of a great deal
of criticism of the American monetary system
and monetary policy, most of which focussed
on the two ideas that, on the one hand, mone-
tary policy was ineffective and, on the other
hand, that it was severely discriminatory in
its impact. When the Commission was estab-
lished, it was stated that one of its functions
would be to examine these criticisms.It was
also stated that if the Commission should find
no need for fundamental changes, this would
also be a contribution.Therefore, from the
standpoint of the expectations held when the
Commission was established,itsfailureto
recommend far-reaching changes need not be
disappointing.
With respect to Harry Johnson's paper, the
most serious thing I have to say is Amen. I
would say Amen particularly to his discussion
of exchange rates and of growth as an objec-
tive of policy.
I must confess that after reading Johnson's
paper I am still confused about the status of
high employment and price stability as goals
of national policy.I can introduce my dif-
ficulty by going back to the reason for not
accepting growth as an objective. There is a
prior objective, which is that people should
be free to use their resources as they wish.
To the extent that people, given the real op-
portunities that exist, want to use their re-
sources to increase their future incomes they
should be free to do so. And to the extent that
they do not want to use their resources in that
way they should not be required to do so.
Some rate of national growth —whichmay
be zero or negative —willemerge from these
individual decisions. It seems to me this is theSHORT-RUN OBJECTIVES OF MONETARY POLICY
proper rate of growth. At least I do not know
any other rate of growth that is better.
Much the same position can be taken about
high employment.I do not know what is a
good level of total employment in the country,
or even a good rate of measured unemploy-
ment. We want people to be able to work if
they want to do so, given the real possible
conditions.Essentially this means that we
want people to be able to find jobs if they are
willing to work for a real wage equal to the
real value of their marginal product. It seems
to me, or sometimes it seems to me, that
monetary policy serves its function with re-
spect to employment if it does not frustrate the
effort of workers to find work by reducing their
money wages. One way to do this is to main-
tain and assure a stable level of prices. This is
not the only way to accomplish this.Any
certain rate of change of the price level would
do. But if we are going to choose among cer-
tain rates of change in the price level there
seem to me to be some advantages to choos-
ing zero. We still have a large number of in-
stitutions and ways of behavior that are predi-
cated on the assumption of zero. In any case,
it does not seem to me to be the proper func-
tion of monetary policy to fool people into
working for less wages than they expected. If
I were forced to defend this position, I suppose
I would rely on some moral precept about
telling the truth.
I would like to say a word about Abba
Lerner's remarks on the trade off between un-
employment and price stability.I think those
who are uncertain about which to choose would
not be satisfied to regard the choice as between
x per cent more unemployment in this year and
i cent more inflation in the same year, or
'even between X per cent more unemployment
and Y per cent more inflation.They would
insist on looking at a longer period.They
would ask whether, if we accepti per cent
more unemployment in this year or in the next
two or three years in order to avoid inflation
now, we may help to create conditions which
will permit us to have both high employment
and price stability over a longer period. There
is at least the possibility that by placing great
weight on the price stability goal now we may
so affect the process of price and wage deter-
mination as to resolve the high employment-
price stability conflict in the future.
Some consideration must also be given to
the fact that the same noncompetitive market
forces that create a conflict between high em-
ployment and price stability may also cause
serious losses of efficiency through their effects
on the allocation of resources.There is a
danger that if we paper over the, effects of
these market imperfections on employment by
inflation, we will accept as permanent their
consequences for the allocation of resources.
I think that Johnson and I are both left
with a rather small number of policy goals.I
was surprised by Arthur Smithies' review of
the Commission report in which he maintained
that the Commission suffered from having more
goals than policy instruments.I have always
felt my own difficulty, in writing about these
matters, to be the reverse. Perhaps because I
want so little, I have found myself with more
instruments than I have known what to do
with. Therefore I have found myself having
recourse to trivial objectives —suchas mini-
mizing the interest burden of the debt.I am
still rather uncertain whether I have any ob-
jective to tell me what the size of the govern-
ment surplus or deficit should be.
I believe that in a sense Johnson, through no
fault of his own, has been misled in his inter-
pretationofthe Commission Report.He
seems to believe that the goals stated by the
Commission in Chapter 2of the Report are
important to the Commission's following argu-
ments and recommendations. But itis quite
clear from Johnson's own remarks, as well as
from an inspection of the Report, that the goals
as stated in Chapter 2 could not lead to any
specific recommendations of policy except in
a very loose and general way.
As I see it, the Commission did not proceed
from the goals it stated to the elaboration of a
specific set of policies designated to achieve
them. The rationale of the Commission's rec-
ommendations seems to be something like this:
There is some behavior of total money ex-
penditures that is better than others, although
the Commission does not specify what the
superior behavior is.There are a number of
instruments available to the government for
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tures.The Commission'sconcerniswith
sharpening and strengtheningtheseinstru-
ments and getting them into the hands of wise
and responsible people who will determine in
what conditions and for what purposes the
instruments should be used. The Commission
Report does not address itself to what should
be done in any particular set of circumstances.
Therefore, it did not have to specify its goals
more precisely than it did or resolve possible
conflicts among them.
Many economists, including me, findthis
approach unsatisfying. What seems to me to
be. involved here is the old issue about rules
versus authorities. A precise statement of a
goal would have constituted a rule by which
the authorities should be guided, even though
this rule may be less operational than some
other rules that have been proposed.I am
not inclined to defend the unwillingness to
specify rules, but since I have encountered it
in many other connections I would like to
offer an explanation for it.It seems to me that
"practical men" and many economists have a
basic difference in their approach to policy
problems. The economists want to save the
world and run the world from the outside.
That is, they want to affect policy by writing
about it rather than practicing it. Their instru-
ment, therefore, is to lay down rules by which
those who do practice policy should be gov-
erned. The practical men, on the other hand,
whether of business, labor, or government, are
engaged in running the world from the inside.
They are making decisions; they have great
confidence in their ability to make decisions
and do not like to have their discretion limited
by rules specified from the outside. Even busi-
nessmen who have no expectation that they will
ever be in the decision-making position in the
Federal Reserve or the Treasury find the point
of view of the practicing monetary authorities
congenial. The difference between the prac-
tical man and the economist is immediately the
result of experience but may ultimately reflect
some personality difference which leads each
of them to choose the experience he has.
There is one obvious exception to what I
have just said. The pratical men have a strong
affection for one particular rule, which is the
rule that an ounce of gold equals $35.I
would explain this largely on the basis that
the rule is a pretty old one and itis much
easier to stick to an old rule than to formulate
a new one.I might also point out that, far
from finding the exchange rate rule a limitation
on their ability to follow the domestic policy
they regard appropriate, many practical men
regard the exchange rate rule as a reinforce-
ment in their effort to achieve domestic policy
especiallyanti-inflationarypolicy —that
they would prefer even if there were no inter-
national financial constraints.
That leaves me with one final question. Why
do many economists not like rules?It seems
to me there are two possible explanations.
One would be that these economists are modest
about theirabilitytoprescriberulesthat
would yield the desired results.I think that
by all the evidence we can say that this pos-
sibility is extremely unlikely. The other ex-
planation is that many economists, especially
many leaders of economic thinking, hold in
their briefcases the baton of the chairman of
a President's Council of Economic Advisers.
They would not like their future freedom of
action to be inhibited by rules they might lay
down while in academic status.
JOSEPH CONARD,
Swarthmore College
Harry Johnson and Martin Bronfenbrenner
have provided useful criticisms of the report
of the Commission on Money and Credit.
Since their comments are almost exclusively
devoted to shortcomings of the report, an over-
all evaluation of the work of the Commission
requires also the more favorable elements in-
cluded in the remarks of the commentators.
These remarks were largely devoted to Bron-
fenbrenner's paper, and I shall, therefore, con-
fine my comments to Johnson's statement.
With most of his fundamental analysis I am
in warm agreement, and I hope this fact may
not be lost sight of because of my concentra-
tion here upon points where it seems to me the
momentum of his attack led him to unjustified
objections and failureto give credit where
credit is due.
i.I heartily support Johnson's emphasis
on the conflicts between economic goals and theSHORT-RUN OBJECTIVES OF MONETARY POLICY
need to find some way to evaluate the net social
cost or gain of sacrificing some of one goal to
achieve more of another. While I do, therefore,
share his regret that these conflicts among
goals did not receive the emphasis they may
have deserved, I think it is inaccurate to imply
that they were not taken seriously in the final
report of the Commission. In the chapter on
which Johnson was commenting they are given
explicit attention on pages io, 12,13, 17, and
39. In relation to the relevance of these con-
flicts of goals it is not fair to say that the Com-
mission simply "relies on the pious hope for
other measures" than those of money and
credit. What the Commission tried to empha-
size is that we cannot expect monetary and
fiscal policies alone to resolve these conflicts,
and that other measures are, therefore, ex-
tremely important. It would hardly be appro-
priate for a commission on money and credit
to attempt conclusions, beyond their domain,
on the many wide-ranging varieties of policies
that might be examined. Any other decision
would surely have brought legitimate criticism
from the opposite direction (see page 6 of the
Commission report).
2.Inevaluating the social costs of unem-
ployment and of inflation I again find myself
supporting Johnson's criticism of the Com-
mission's tendency to give the goal of price
stability a higher priority than itdeserves.
Yet once again I believe he failed to do the
Commission justice. He says, "the report be-
gins by conjuring up the horrors of hyperin-
flation," implying that the report tries to sup-
port its antiinflation position by reference to
the evils of hyperinflation. My own reading. of
the disputed passage (page 13)suggeststhat
its intention is precisely the opposite. It states
that the fear ofinflationis widespread in
this country, and that this fear arises from evil
consequences often cited as resulting from it.
The wording of the passage clearly avoids
identification of the Commission with these
views, and points out that these evilcon-
sequences cannot be assumed to follow from
mild price increases, but have developed from
hyperinflations of the kind we have no serious
reason to fear in this country. Thus the en-
tire point of the passage seems to be to allay
the excessive fears of moderately rising prices.
Johnson states further that on this founda-
tion the Commission has made the avoidance of
even mild price increases a major economic
goal. That is not accurate. The Commission
states explicitly that it is "unreasonable" price
increases which should be avoided, and never
takes the position that the line should be held
rigidly against any rise in the general price
level. The vagueness of the term "unreason-
able" may open the Commission to criticism
for failing to spell out more precise guide lines,
but it does not permit the charge of having
stood for complete rigidity in the price level.
3. Johnson next asserts that the Commis-
sion ignores the large body of empirical evi-
dence that arbitrary redistribution of income
is difficult to detect in mild inflations. At this
point Johnson's own empirical statementis
only partly accurate. Empirical evidence sup-
ports the view that even mild inflation, if per-
sistent, does alter distribution. To be sure, the
alterationisnot systematically away from
labor or toward greater inequality as was
once supposed. But significant redistribution
may be seen if social groups are differently
classified. Important victims are the aged and
the renters of homes. Furthermore, redistribu-
tion among individuals can be undesirable even
if such redistribution cancels out when these
individuals are grouped.
4. Data compiled for the Commission indi-
cated no correlation between growth rates and
rates of price increase between zero and 6 per
cent per year. Johnson is quite right in point-
ing out that these data infer compatibility of
moderate price increases and growth, an infer-
ence which the Commission failed to draw. But
he is wrong in denying the inference the Com-
mission did draw, namely, that inflation is not
needed as a stimulant of growth.
5.Iagree with Johnson that the widely
assumed negative correlation between level of
unemployment and rate of growth has not been
demonstrated. It is quite true that good argu-
ments to support such a relation can be given,
but contrary influences can also be cited, and
empirical evidence of various kinds fails to give
support for any systematic influence of the
level of unemployment on the rate of growth.
I also agree that in a country like the United
States the case for desiring more economic154 SHORT-RUN OBJECTIVES OF MONETARY POLICY
growth than would come without our seeking
it by conscious policy is chiefly a political argu-
ment related to international competition. Fi-
nally, I accept Johnson's view that monetary and
credit policy can at best have only limited in-
fluence on the rate of growth.
Despite these facts I cannot see a significant
objection to the Commission's selection of its
three primary goals, nor do I think it legitimate
to characterize them entirely as "fads."It
does not seem reasonable to hold that the de-
sire for low levels of unemployment is a fad
just because it received inadequate attention
before the thirties. Economic growth was an
assumed goal for Adam Smith, Ricardo, Marx,
and many economists since that time, though
largely overlooked by the neoclassical writers.
It is critically important for underdeveloped
areas, and thus it acquires some importance
for us in relation to aid policies. While the
desire for extreme rigidity of price levels rep-
resents a current emphasis, worry over the gen-
eral problem of inflation is as old as the quan-
tity theory of money, which long antedates
even classical economic writing.
To a large extent I am sympathetic with
Johnson's remark that from the standpoint of
economic objectives we might well accept what-
ever rate of growth results from individual
choice between consumption and saving.
ever, such a statement oversimplifies the prob-
lem. So long as monetary and fiscal policies are
carried out to maintain a desired level of ag-
gregate demand, and so long as different mon-
etary and fiscal policies have different effects
on growth, some kind of growth policy is re-
quired.
These comments stress the points where
Johnson seems to me to overstate his objections
to the Commission report. As a result of over-
statements like these, together with an almost
total absence of recognition of the report's
achievements, the paper gives a general im-
pression which is seriously unfair to the achieve-
ments of the Commission. At the same time I
would emphasize again my agreement with the
main thrust of Johnson's more important criti-
cisms. The purpose of this note is in no sense
to give an unqualified defense of the report, but
to urge a balanced evaluation.
F. CliRisi,
The Johns Hopkins University
I propose the following resolution, which
clearly will command the unanimous assent of
those who have spoken here:
Whereas, the United States has continued to
experience some undesirable cyclical fluctua-
tions in economic activity in recent years, and
Whereas, Mr. Herbert Stein has opined in
his remarks before this conference that the
number of economic goals of first importance
for the United States economy is rather small
compared with the number of instruments
available, so that there are more instruments
than one knows what to do with, and
Whereas, Mr. Milton Friedman has argued
from the floor of these sessions that although in
principle it might be possible for substantial
fluctuations in economic activity to occur while
the quantity of money was held stable, or was
increased at a constant rate, in fact this has
never happened, and we must respect the em-
pirical evidence in such a case, and
Whereas, Mr. Friedman and Mrs. Anna
Schwartz have argued in their paper before this
conference that "sizable changes in the rate of
change of the money stock are a necessary and
sufficient condition for sizable changes in the
rate of change of money income," and that
"for minor movements ... whilethe evidence
was far less strong, it is plausible to suppose
that changes in the stock of money played an
important independent role," and
Whereas, Mr. Friedman has argued else-
where that if the quantity of money is increased
at a constant rate of say 4 per cent per year,
then cyclical fluctuations of economic activity
will be reduced more effectively than by any
other available policy, and
Whereas,Messrs.JamesDuesenberry,
Franco Modigliani, Hyman Minsky, Arthur
Okun, and others have argued from the floor of
this conference and elsewhere that changes in
the rate of increase of the stock of money are
not very important in generating cyclical fluc-
tuations in economic activity, while other influ-
ences are very important, including government
expenditures and taxation and interest rates
and changes in the importance, of money substi-
tutes and nonbank financial institutions, andSHORT-RUN OBJECTIVES OF MONETARY POLICY
Whereas, the members of this conference are
united in the quest for scientific truth and im-
proved economic policy,
Now therefore be it resolved:
(i) That for the next eight years (about as
long as two recent cycles) the monetary au-
thorities be directed to follow a policy of in-
creasing the stock of money (using Mr. Fried-
man's definition, currency plus demand de-
posits adjusted plus time deposits in commer-
cial banks) at the uniform rate of 4 per cent
per annum, or as near thereto as may be, and
(2)Thatthe monetary and fiscal authori-
ties be instructed meanwhile to apply whatever
discretionary policies they deem most appro-
priate, involving deficits, surpluses, issuance
and retirement of government debt, open-mar-
ket operations, variation of reserve require-
ments, regulation of financial intermediaries,
and the like, provided only that the aforemen-
tioned 4 per cent annum rule is not violated,
and
Thatin 1970.anotherconference be held
to examine the results.
This resolution can be easily defended.
First, Mr. Friedman and those who share
his policy views should support it,for itis
surely a good policy if fluctuations in the rate
of change of the money stock are the main
cause of cyclical variations in economic activ-
ity.
Second, Messrs. Duesenberry, Modigliani,
Minsky, Okun, and those who share their policy
views should support it, since it offers discre-
tionary power over variables that are the most
important causes of fluctuations in economic
activity if the money stock is not.
Third,itisalmost inconceivable that a
policy of adhering to the rule of increasing the
money stock at 4 per cent per year coupled with
discretionary policy in all other respects could
lead to results inferior to those experienced in
the United States to date.
Fourth, by executing this policy we are likely
to obtain at least one of two additional benefits,
as follows. (a) If economic fluctuations during
the years 1962 to 1970 under this policy should
turn out to be of approximately the same magni-
tude as we have been experiencing, then, al-
though there would have been no improvement
in policy, we would at least have gained a meas-
ure of scientific truth, namely: it would have
been shown that Mr. Friedman's claims for the
efficacy of the rate of increase of the money
stock were exaggerated. (b) If economic fluc-
tuations during 1962 to 1970 under this policy
should turn out to be less severe than those we
have been experiencing, we might still be con-
fused on the scientific issue, but then we would
at least have had eight years of greater stability
than heretofore.